

Message Text

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ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 NSC-05 CIAE-00

INR-07 NSAE-00 L-03 H-02 AID-05 EB-07 MC-02 SAB-01

IGA-02 OMB-01 TRSE-00 /063 W
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R 201436Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6813

SECDEF/DSAA-ISA

JCS/J-5

INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS SCSA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 PANAMA 1296

JOINT EMBASSY/USMILGP MESSAGE

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS

SUBJECT: FY 77 MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE

REF: JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE STATE 36160

THIS MESSAGE RESPONDS TO REQUIREMENTS OF PARAS 4 AND 5 REFTTEL,
WITH RESPONSE KEYED TO PARA AND SUBPARA LETTERING:

PARA 4A: WE DO NOT ENVISION ANY MAJOR ITEM ACQUISITION FROM
FY 77 GRANT AID MATERIAL FUNDS. THESE FUNDS WILL CONTINUE
TO PROVIDE FOLLOW-ON SUPPORT FOR EQUIPMENT ALREADY IN THE
PANAMANIAN GUARDIA NACIONAL (GN) INVENTORY.

PARA 4B: NO RESPONSE REQUIRED.

PARA 5A: HOST COUNTRY WOULD ACCEPT AND CONSUMATE CREDIT
AGREEMENT AT LEAST AT LEVEL INDICATED.

PARA 5B. MAJOR ITEM PROCUREMENT IN ORDER OF PRIORITY IS:

PRIORITY 1: PARTIAL FINANCING OF 25 (EA) ARMORED

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VEHICLES PURCHASED FROM US MANUFACTURERS (SEE ALSO

SUBPARA 5J BELOW).

PRIORITY 2: 3 (EA) HALTHER MARINE 85-FOOT SPECIAL
PATROL BOATS.

PRIORITY 3: PARTIAL FINANCING FOR PURCHASE OF 1 (EA) C-130E
AIRCRAFT.

PARA 5C: YES IN CONCEPT. OUR LATEST JSOP AND MSAP INPUT
REFLECTS THE ACTIVATION OF A NEW GN BATTALION DURING THIS
TIME FRAME. DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS APPROVED (STATE 4358)
THE SALE OF ARMS THROUGH FMS TO SUPPORT THIS PROJECT. ARMS
PROPOSED FOR PURCHASE FOR WHICH CREDIT WOULD BE PROVIDED
WILL THUS SERVE TO SATISFY MILITARY REQUIREMENT JUSTIFIABLY
DERIVED, IN OUR JUDGMENT, FROM THIS US-APPROVED FORCE GOAL.
PARA 5D: GN PLANNING HAS BEEN INHIBITED OVER THE YEARS BY
PRESENCE OF US MILITARY IN PANAMA AND US COMMITMENT TO
DEFENSE OF CANAL UNDER 1903 TREATY TO VISUALIZING PRIMARY GN ROLES
AS POLICE FUNCTION, CIVIL ORDER AND HANDLING OF ISOLATED
TROUBLE SPOTS. GN HAS NOT, UP TO THE PRESENT, PLANNED FOR NATIONAL
DEFENSE OR DEFENSE OF PANAMA CANAL. BOTH OF THESE LATTER
ROLES ARE NOW ASSUMING INCREASING PROMINENCE IN GN FORWARD
PLANNING FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENTS. ONGOING CANAL TREATY NEGOTIATIONS,
IN PARTICULAR, ARE PROCEEDING ON ASSUMPTION THAT GN WILL
PARTICIPATE WITH US MILITARY IN DEFENSE OF PANAMA CANAL AS
GN DEVELOPS CAPABILITY TO DO SO. AS GN PLANS, PREPARES FOR
AND ASSUMES THESE NEW ROLES, ITS REALIZATION OF INADEQUACY,
AND DEMANDS FOR BETTER AND MORE SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT WILL
INCREASE. ITS LEGITIMATE MILITARY EQUIPMENT NEEDS WILL FAR
SURPASS ITS ABILITY TO PROCURE AND PAY FOR ITEMS IT REQUIRES
AT TIME OF PURCHASE. ITEMS MENTIONED IN FOREGOING SUB-PARAS
ARE ALL JUSTIFIABLE REQUIREMENTS OF GN MILITARY,
BUT WILL CONSTITUTE MERELY FIRST PART OF ITS REQUIREMENTS
TO FIT IT FOR NEW ROLES WHICH IT WILL BE ASSUMING OVER COMING
FEW YEARS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, CREDIT SALES ARE JUSTIFIED TO
FACILITATE EQUIPPING GN TO EXERCISE THESE ROLES.

PARA 5E: THE CREDIT PROGRAM IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE GRANT
MATERIAL AND TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THAT AS THE GN FORCES ARE
STRUCTURED INTO TACTICAL ELEMENTS SUITABLE FOR NEW GN FORCE
ROLES, THE CREDIT PROGRAM WILL ALLOW MAJOR ITEM PROCUREMENT
WHILE THE GRANT TRAINING PROGRAM PROVIDES FOR TECHNICAL
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SKILLS TO OPERATE NEW EQUIPMENT AND ALLOWS FOR FLEXABILITY
WITHIN EXPANDING ELEMENTS. THE GRANT MATERIAL PROGRAM PROVIDES
A MEANS OF SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED UNDER
GRANT PROGRAMS AND FORMS A LOGISTICAL FRAMEWORK ON WHICH
FUTURE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE BASED.

PARA 5F: FIRST, IT IS US POLICY (STATE 300217 12/22/75) TO
REMAIN PANAMA'S PRINCIPAL OR SOLE SUPPLIER OF ARMS NOW AND IN

THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. PROVISION OF ADEQUATE CREDIT TERMS FOR PURCHASE OF ARMS IS IMPORTANT, IF NOT ESSENTIAL, FOR US TO MAINTAIN THIS ROLE. SECOND, ONGOING CANAL TREATY NEGOTIATIONS ENVISION GN PARTICIPATING JOINTLY WITH US MILITARY IN DEFENSE OF PANAMA CANAL. TO PERMIT THIS, IT IS A NECESSARY US OBJECTIVE TO BUILD AND MAINTAIN A CLOSE, COOPERATIVE AND HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GN AS AN INSTITUTION, AND CREDIT SALES OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY SUPPORTIVE OF THIS OBJECTIVE. FURTHER, JOINT PARTICIPATION BY THE GN IN FUTURE DEFENSE OF THE PANAMA CANAL WILL BE CONSIDERABLY FACILITATED ON TECHNICAL MILITARY GROUNDS IF THERE IS GENERAL COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN MAJOR ITEMS OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT IN GN INVENTORY AND COMPARABLE ITEMS USED BY US FORCES. THIRD, AS A NEW CANAL TREATY APPROACHES ITS TERMINATION, IT WILL BE A FUNDAMENTAL US OBJECTIVE TO HAVE BUILT AND MAINTAINED A CLIMATE OF OPINION AND A COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP, AS WELL AS CONCRETE AND MATERIAL TIES ARISING OUT OF OUR ROLE AS PRINCIPAL ARMS SUPPLIER, WHICH WILL FACILITATE OUR REACHING SOME ARRANGMENT FOR CONTINUATION OF US DEFENSE RELATIONSHIPS WITH PANAMA RELATIVE TO THE CANAL SUBSEQUENT TO THE TERMINATION OF THE NEW TREATY ITSELF. DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE TREATY, IN SHORT, WE MUST SEEK TO TIE THE GN, AS IRREVOCABLY AS POSSIBLE, TO THE US WITH BONDS THAT WILL OUTLAST THE TREATY PROPER. CREDIT MILITARY SALES WILL AID SIGNIFICANTLY IN DOING THIS. FOURTH AND FINALLY, THE ULTIMATE US OBJECTIVE IN PANAMA, BOTH DURING AND BEYOND THE LIFETIME OF THE NEW TREATY IS TO MAINTAIN THE PANAMA CANAL OPEN, SAFE, EFFICIENT AND NEUTRAL, AND AVAILABLE TO OUR VESSELS AND THOSE OF THE REST OF THE WORLD. IN THE LONG RUN, MUCH OF THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE WILL RELATE DIRECTLY TO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE GN IN PROVIDING FOR DEFENSE OF THE CANAL, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE NEW TREATY NOW UNDER NEGOTIATION. AVAILABILITY OF
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ADEQUATE ARMS AND EQUIPMENT UNDER SUITABLE CREDIT TERMS FROM THE US, IN ADDITION TO BEING SUPPORTIVE OF THE FOREGOING THREE POLICY OBJECTIVES, WILL BE AN IMPORTANT PART OF PREPARATIONS AGAINST THE DAY WHEN THE PRINCIPAL ON-THE-GROUND DEFENSE OF THE CANAL, AND OF PANAMA, WILL BE SOLELY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GN, WHO WILL ESSENTIALLY BE SERVING OUR INTERESTS AS WELL IN EXECUTING THIS RESPONSIBILITY.

PARA 5G: RESPONSE TO THIS QUESTION BREAKS INTO TWO PARTS, I.E., PANAMA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS LATIN NEIGHBORS EXCEPT FOR CUBA, AND ITS MILITARY POSITION VIS-A-VIS CUBA.

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ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 NSC-05 CIAE-00

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6814

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INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS/SCSA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 PANAMA 1296

JOINT STATE/MILGRP MESSAGE

A. RELATIVE TO ITS LATIN NEIGHBORS, CREDIT
SALE OF US ARMS WILL NEITHER AFFECT A REGIONAL ARMS
BALANCE NOR CONTRIBUTE TO AN ARMS RACE. PANAMA HAS NO
OUTSTANDING BORDER DISPUTES WITH EITHER OF ITS LAND NEIGHBORS,
COLOMBIA OR COSTA RICA. PANAMA DOES NOT REGARD ITSELF AS
IN ARMS COMPETITION WITH EITHER OF THESE STATES, OR WITH ANY OF
ITS OTHER NEARBY LATIN NEIGHBORS. NOR, SO FAR
AS WE ARE AWARE, DO ANY OF THESE NEIGHBORS REGARD THEMSELVES
AS IN COMPETITION WITH PANAMA. AS NOTED ABOVE, ONE OF THE
PRINCIPAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CREDIT ARMS SALES TO PANAMA IS
TO DEVELOP ITS CAPABILITY TO PARTICIPATE ADEQUATELY IN
IN THE DEFENSE OF THE PANAMA CANAL. UNLESS AND UNTIL SOME OF
ITS LATIN NEIGHBORS BECOME POTENTIAL THREATS TO THE CANAL--WHICH
IS NOT NOW THE CASE AND WHICH WE DO NOT EXPECT WILL BECOME
THE CASE IN ANY REALISTIC CONCEIVABLE FUTURE--SUCH
DEVELOPMENT OF GN CAPABILITY HAS LITTLE OR NO RELATIONSHIP
TO REGIONAL ARMS BALANCE OR TO A REGIONAL ARMS RACE.

B. CUBA, IN OUR VIEW, IS NOT ESSENTIALLY A STRICTLY
REGIONAL PROBLEM, BUT RATHER IS A MANIFESTATION OF A GLOBAL
PROBLEM AFFECTING PANAMA'S INTERESTS IN GREAT MEASURE TO
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THE EXTENT THAT THEY ARE COTERMINOUS WITH US INTERESTS ON THE ISTHMUS, I.E., IN TERMS OF THREAT, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, TO THE CANAL. AN "ARMS RACE" BETWEEN PANAMA AND CUBA IS NOT A REALISTIC PROPOSITION--PANAMA BY ITSELF IS TOO SMALL, AND THE US, WE FEEL, WOULD NOT BE ABOUT TO BANKROLL IT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO SUPPORT CUBA. HOWEVER, WHEN CONSIDERING THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE REALISTIC POTENTIAL CUBAN THREAT TO PANAMA, THAT OF CUBAN-INSPIRED OR SUPPORTED INSURGENCY OR TERRORIST/GUERILLA ACTION, CREDIT ARMS SALES WOULD INDISPUTABLY AFFECT THIS BALANCE--VERY MUCH TO THE PANAMANIAN AND, HENCE, THE US, ADVANTAGE.

PARA 5H: YES. PANAMA WILL NOT HAVE THE READY CASH TO ACQUIRE NEW MATERIAL COMENSURATE WITH HER REQUIREMENTS ON ANY BUT THE BEST AVAILABLE CREDIT TERMS FOR PURCHASE.

PARA 5I: PANAMA'S DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ARE ADEQUATELY SUPPORTED, AND APPEAR LIKELY TO BE SO, FROM BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SOURCES, IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY HAS GROWN RAPIDLY OVER MOST OF THE PAST DECADE, AND HAS GOOD PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUING ITS GROWTH AS THE WORLDWIDE RECESSION OF THE PAST FEW YEARS MODERATES. THE COUNTRY HAS ALSO DEVELOPED RAPIDLY AS A HEMISPHERIC CENTER OF BANKING, COMMERCE AND FINANCE, AND APPEARS LIKELY TO CONTINUE SUCH DEVELOPMENT. ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEW CANAL TREATY WILL PROBABLY FACILITATE THIS PROCESS. GOP PROJECTIONS (ALBEIT PROBABLY OPTIMISTIC ONES) ARE THAT WITHIN NEXT 15 YEARS, PER CAPITA GNP FOR COUNTRY COULD AS MUCH AS DOUBLE IN CONSTANT DOLLAR TERMS, ASSUMING THAT CURRENT DEVELOPMENT PLANS CAN BE MET AND GROWTH OF COMMERCE, FINANCE AND BANKING CONTINUES AT PRESENT, GN ACCOUNTS FOR ONLY A SMALL FRACTION OF GOP OVERALL NATIONAL BUDGET. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT PANAMA HAS THE CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT CREDIT MILITARY SALES OF MAGNITUDE ENVISAGED ABOVE WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT HARM TO DEVELOPMENT PLANS AND WITHOUT CLAIMS ON FUTURE BUDGETS EXCESSIVE TO WHAT COUNTRY MAY REALISTICALLY BE EXPECTED TO PAY FOR ITS NATIONAL DEFENSE. WHILE PUBLIC DEBT, BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL, HAS GROWN RAPIDLY OVER PAST SEVERAL YEARS PRIMARILY AS A RESULT OF COUNTRY'S AMBITIOUS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, NORMAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS DO NOT APPLY IN CASE OF PANAMA AS DOLLAR IS UTILIZED AS
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DE FACTO CURRENCY.

PARA 5J: PANAMA HAS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED THIS YEAR APPROVAL FOR PURCHASE OF MORTARS AND RECOILLESS RIFLES UNDER FMS PROCEDURES. ADDITIONAL APPROVAL TO SEEK A COMMERCIAL SUPPLIER

FOR ARMORED VEHICLES HAS BEEN OBTAINED. ALL OF THESE PURCHASES ARE DESIGNED TO ACTIVATE THE FIRST OF FOUR GN BATTALIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WE FEEL THAT IF THE PROPOSED CREDIT IS APPROVED, THE FIRST PRIORITY OF THE GN WILL BE TO HELP FINANCE THE ARMORED VEHICLE PURCHASE, WHICH IS ESTIMATED AT A TOTAL OF \$4-MILLION. NO THIRD COUNTRY PURCHASES ARE KNOWN TO BE CONTEMPLATED BY THE GN AT THIS TIME.

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Message Attributes

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